Ruth B. Hardy Revocable Trust v. Eagle Mountain Lots, LLC: Errata by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2011
Ruth B. Hardy Revocable Trust v. Eagle Mountain
Lots, LLC: Errata
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James C. Swindler; Wayne G. Petty; Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler; Attorneys for Appellees.
Gerald H. Kinghorn; Jeremy R. Cook; Parsons Kinghorn Harris; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Ruth B. Hardy Revocable Trust v. Eagle Mountain Lots, LLC, No. 20110339 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2853
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUTH B. HARDY REVOCABLE TRUST, 
DELCON CORPORATION PROFIT SHARING 
PLAN FBO A. WESLEY HARDY AKA DELCON 
CORP. PSP FBO A. W. HARDY, FINESSE 
P.S.P., MJS REAL PROPERTIES LLC AKA 
MJS REALPROPERTIES, UINTAH 
INVESTMENTS, LLC AKA UINTAH 
INVESTMENTS, DAVID D. SMITH, STEVEN 
CONDIE, DAVID L. JOHNSON, BERRETT PSP, 
VW PROFESSIONAL HOMES PSP, TY 
THOMAS, AND D.R.P. MANAGEMENT PSP, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs. 
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MOUNTAIN LOTS, LLC, GRANT BYBEE, 
BB&S, LLC, ROBERT A. JONES DBA BB&S, 
LLC, THE CIRCLE OF BUILDERS, L.L.C, 
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Defendants and Appellants. 
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On October 17, 2011, Appellees filed their Brief. Appellees, through their 
counsel, submit this errata sheet to correct a typographical error within the text of the 
Brief. The corrected text (with corrected text underlined) should read as follows: 
Page 22, first paragraph, fourth line: Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-9(4)... 
DATED this 20th day of October, 2011. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
James C. Swindler (#3177) 
Wayne G. Petty (#2596) 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of October, 2011,1 served a copy of the 
foregoing by mail to the following: 
Gerald H. Kinghorn 
Jeremy R. Cook 
Parsons Kinghorn Harris 
111 East Broadway, 11 Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
9
 till 
Richard V. Thomas, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Ashley Regional Medical Center; Si Hutt, 
individually; John Griffith, MD, individually; 
David Perry, MD, individually; David 
Richards, MD, individually; Kimberly 
Kobernick, RN, individually; Debbie 
Spafford, individually, 
Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO AMEND 
COMPLAINT 
Case No. 110800013 
Judge EDWIN T. PETERSON 
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs 
Amended Complaint and Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. 
The Defendants bring this Motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, The Defendants argue the Complaint should be dismissed because res judicata bars 
the causes of action, the defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are 
barred by the one year statute of limitation and the Plaintiff failed to plead fraud with 
particularity. 
Previously, the Plaintiff filed a complaint in case number 080925868 on December 16, 
2008. The complaint alleged that Ashley Regional Medical Center's (ARMC) administration 
and medical staff engaged in fabrication and falsification of records and testimony regarding his 
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care of patients. The complaint alleged ARMC did this in an effort to deprive him of his clinical 
privileges and medical staff membership. The December 16, 2008, complaint brought claims of 
breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, defamation and restraint of 
trade. On January 6, 2010, the Court dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute. 
On January 7, 2011, the Plaintiff filed a new Complaint in this case which is virtually 
identical to the complaint filed in case number 080925868 except that additional individual 
ARMC employees are named and new claims for fraud, negligence and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress were alleged. The new Complaint is based on the same allegation as the 
previous complaint: that the Plaintiff was the victim of a concerted effort to fabricate criticisms 
of his care of patients in October 2008 in order to improperly remove him from the medical staff 
at ARMC. 
First, the Defendants argue the Complaint is barred by res judicata under both claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion. Claim preclusion "bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent 
action a claim that has been fully litigated previously." Snyder v. Murray City Corp,, 73 P.3d 
325 (Utah 2003). Here, the claim of breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, defamation and restraint of trade have already been litigated. Therefore, they are barred 
by res judicata. Issue preclusion "prevents the relitigation of issues that have been once litigated 
and determined in another action even though the claims for relief in the two actions may be 
different." Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). Here, the 
Plaintiffs claims clearly pertain to the issues raised in the December 16, 2008, complaint. Those 
issues have been previously litigated and are therefore barred by res judicata. 
Second, the Defendants argue the Plaintiffs defamation and intentional infliction of 
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emotional distress claims are barred by the one year statute of limitation, Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-2-302(4) provides a one year statute of limitation for libel, slander, false imprisonment or 
seduction. An intentional infliction of emotional distress claim tied to the same operative facts 
that give rise to a defamation claim also has a one year statute of limitation. Russell v. Thompson 
Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 906-07 (Utah 1992). Here, the Plaintiff alleges the incident 
giving rise to the claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress occurred 
in October of 2008. Clearly, those claims are barred by the one year statute of limitations. 
Finally, the Defendants argue the Plaintiff failed to plead fraud with particularity as 
required by Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs Complaint alleges the 
Defendants maliciously and in bad faith made incomplete or false entries in unspecified medical 
records, or maliciously and in bad faith presented information to others which they knew to be 
incomplete or false. These claims do not satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b). 
Next, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint. Rule 15(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court discretion in allowing an amended pleading, and 
instructs that leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. Here Justice does not require 
allowing the Plaintiff to amend his Complaint. The Complaint has already been amended once. 
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs claims have already by litigated in a previous complaint. The 
Plaintiff had ample opportunity to pursue his claims but failed to do so and the claims were 
dismissed. The Defendants have been defending against the Plaintiffs allegations since 
December of 2008. Allowing an amendment to a complaint that has already been amended and 
is virtually identical to a complaint previously litigated would not do justice to the Defendants. 
Therefore, the Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend is denied. 
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The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is granted. The 
dismissal of the Plaintiffs Complaint resolves the other Motions subsequently filed and the 
Court will not consider them. 
Dated this T day of _ M*M ,2011. 
BY THE COURT: 
RSON, District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 110800013 by the method and on the date 
specified, 
MAIL: RICHARD V THOMAS MD 38 E 100 N SUITE A VERBAL, UT 84078 
MAIL; ROBERT R HARRISON 10 EXCHANGE PLACE 11TH FLR POB 4 5000 SALT 
LAKE CITY UT 8414 5 / 
Data, <W\\ CT^/L 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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ay. 
PETER STIRBA (Bar No. 3118) 
DARIN GOFF (Bar No. 11355) 
R. BLAKE HAMILTON (Bar No. 11395) 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
215 South State Street, Suite 750 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0810 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
Facsimile: (801) 364-8355 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 16 2008 
SALI LAKfc COUN'IY 
Deputy Clark 
RICHARD THOMAS, M.D. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ASHLEY REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER; SI HUTT, individually; and 
BRUCE GUYANT, individually; 
Defendants. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Case No. n^C'*! 5L*3Z& 8 
Judge y^jjl-e.r-
Plaintiff Richard Thomas, M.D. by and through the undersigned counsel, hereby 
complains against Defendants, and alleges as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Richard Thomas, M.D. is a physician practicing obstetrics and gynecology 
("OB/GYN") in Vernal, Utah. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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2. Defendant Ashley Regional Medical Center ("Ashley Regional") is a private 
medical facility wholly owned by LifePoint Hospitals and located in Vernal, Utah. 
i 
3. Defendant Si Hutt ("Hutt") is the CEO of Ashley Regional. 
4. Defendant Bruce Guyant ("Guyant") is the Regional Director of Physician 
Recruiting for LifePoint Hospitals. ! 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE \ 
5. This Court has original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78A-5-102 (formerly UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3-4). 
6. Venue in this action is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-
304 (formerly UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-13-4) and § 78B-3-307 (formerly UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
13-7), as Defendant Guyant is located in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
7. Dr. Thomas, has clinical privileges and medical staff membership at Ashley 
Regional. 
8. Dr. Thomas has practiced as an OB/GYN at Ashley Regional since November 
2004. 
9. Dr. Thomas' practice relies on referrals from other physicians and the community 
for new patients. Dr. Thomas' practice is particularly reliant on referrals from Ashley Regional's 
medical staff. Patients seeking an OB/GYN physician are unwilling to consider care from a 
physician who may not be practicing in the community in the near future because they desire 
continuity of care throughout their pregnancy. Physicians and persons in the community will not 
2 
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refer new patients to an OB/GYN if they believe that the OB/GYN's practice will close in the \ 
i ! 
near future and that the OB/GYN will not be available to care for the patient for the duration of a | 
! 
I 
pregnancy and the delivery of the baby. ! 
MEDICAL STAFF BYLAWS, THE FAIR HEARING PLAN 
AND MEDICAL STAFF RULES AND REGULATIONS 
10. Dr. Thomas' clinical privileges and medical staff membership at Ashley Regional 
are governed by Medical Staff Bylaws ("the Bylaws"), the Fair Hearing Plan, and the Medical 
Staff Rules and Regulations ("Staff Rules"). 
11. The Bylaws, ^ 8.3-1 provide for summary suspension of a practitioner's clinical 
privileges: 
whenever a practitioner's conduct requires that immediate action be taken to 
protect the life of any patients or to reduce the substantial likelihood of immediate 
injury or damage to the health and safety of any patient , . . . . 
13. The Bylaws, ^ 8.3-2 provide that after a summary suspension, the Medical 
Executive Committee ("the MEC") shall be promptly convened to review and consider the action 
taken. The MEC may recommend to the Board of Trustees modification, continuance, or 
termination of the terms of the summary suspension. 
14. The Bylaws, *f 8.3-3 provide that if the MEC recommends corrective action then 
the practitioner shall be entitled to the procedural rights of Article IX of the Bylaws and the Fair 
Hearing Plan. 
15. The Bylaws, Tf 14.3 contain the following clause with respect to the confidentiality 
of information: 
3 
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Information, with respect to any practitioner, submitted, collected, or prepared by 
any representative of this or any other health care facility or organization or 
Medical Staff for the purpose of achieving and maintaining quality patient care, 
reducing morbidity and mortality, or contributing to clinical research shall, to the 
fullest extent permitted by law, be confidential and shall not be disseminated to 
anyone other than a representative, nor used in any way except as provided herein 
or except as otherwise required by law. Such confidentiality shall also extend to 
information of like kind that may be provided by third parties. This information 
shall not become part of any particular patient's file or of the general hospital 
records. 
16. The Bylaws, % 14.5-1 contain the following clause with respect to the activities 
that are covered by the confidentiality clause contained in the Bylaws, |^ 14.3: 
The confidentiality and immunity provided by this Article shall apply to all acts, 
communications, reports, recommendations, or disclosures performed or made in 
connection with this or any other health care facility's or organization's activities 
concerning, but not limited to: 
$ >JC 5JC 5|C }|« 
(c) Corrective action. 
(d) Hearings and appellate reviews. 
(e) Other hospital department, committee, or Medical Staff activities related to 
Process Improvement activities and appropriate professional conduct. 
17. Section II of the Staff Rules governs Medical Records including the 
Content of the progress notes and directs that progress notes are to be recorded at the 
time of observation. 
18. Section 3.3 of the Fair Hearing Plan provides: 
The practitioner who requested the hearing shall be entitled to be accompanied 
and represented at the hearing by an appointee of the Medical Staff in good 
standing or by a member of his local professional society. 
4 
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19. Section 3.4.1 of the Fair Hearing Plan provides that Dr. Thomas may call 
witnesses on his own behalf. 
20. Section 3.8 of the Fair Hearing Plan provides: 
Request for a postponement of a hearing shall be granted by the Hearing Officer, only 
upon a showing of good cause and only if the request is made as soon as practical. 
EFFORTS TO REPLACE PR THOMAS 
18. As a member of the medical staff, Dr. Thomas began experiencing friction 
with Ashley Regional and its CEO Defendant Hutt. As a result of this friction Defendant 
Hutt and Ashley Regional decided to push Dr. Thomas out. 
19. In August 2008 Defendant Hutt attended a confidential medical staff meeting. 
The medical staff attending the meeting are referral sources for Dr. Thomas. During the meeting 
Hutt advised the medical staff that Dr. Thomas was "not going to make it" and stated that he was 
actively recruiting another OB/GYN to replace Dr. Thomas. 
20. In furtherance of its efforts to push Dr. Thomas out, Ashley Regional began 
recruiting for a new OB/GYN physician to join Ashley Regional's medical staff. Sometime 
during the summer or fall of 2008, Defendant Guyant, mass e-mailed a recruiting notice stating 
as follows: 
OB-GYN—The Hospital had 27% grown year over year from 2006 over 2007. 
Many young families are moving to the area for work. Dr. Griffith has a full 
practice as does Dr. Breitenbach (FP/OB). Dr. Anderson (FP/OB is on track to 
deliver about 60 babies this year. Dr. Thomas, OB/GYN—who arrived 2 years 
before Dr. Thomas (sic) is struggling and it appears he may not stay in the 
community. The new physician would replace Dr. Thomas, as there probably is 
not room for 5 OBs on staff. 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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21. Upon information and belief, the information contained in the recruiting notice 
was provided to Defendant Guyant by Ashley Regional and/or Defendant Hutt, 
SURGERY AND CARE OF PATIENT B.S. 
22. On October 8, 2008, Dr. Thomas performed a vaginal hysterectomy on a patient 
identified as B.S. During the surgery the anesthetist noted that B.S.'s blood pressure fluctuated. 
This fluctuation continued as B.S. recovered post-operatively. The fact that B.S.'s blood 
pressure was fluctuating was communicated by the recovery nurse to the Kimberly Kobernick, 
the medical floor nurse who assumed care of B.S. upon her transport from recovery to the 
medical floor. On the medical floor, B.S.'s blood pressure continued to fluctuate. At some point 
her vital signs became unstable. Dr. Thomas was notified. An ultrasound confirmed internal 
bleeding and B.S. was taken immediately from the medical floor for emergency surgery. Dr. 
Thomas performed the emergency surgery and successfully arrested the bleeding. 
23. During the emergency surgery Dr. Thomas observed that B.S.'s platelet count was 
dangerously low. Platelets were unavailable at Ashley Regional. After consultation with the on 
call physician for the Ashley Regional Intensive Care Unit, Dr. Thomas arranged for B.S. to be 
transferred by air to Intermountain Medical Center in Salt Lake City to receive platelets and 
further treatment. 
24. Subsequent to the surgery Dr. Thomas discovered that Kobernick falsified entries 
to B.S.'s chart to make it appear that she had properly monitored B.S. and alerted Dr. Thomas in 
a timely fashion to the patient's declining blood pressure and suspected blood loss. Kobernick's 
chart notes also contain inconsistencies suggesting she was with the patient in the patient's 
6 
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hospital room when in fact B.S. was in surgery. 
25. Upon discovering the deliberate misrepresentations and inconsistencies made by 
Kobernick in B.S.'s chart, Dr. Thomas dictated an extensive chart note documenting his care of 
B.S. and the decision to return her to the operating room and the misrepresentations and 
inconsistencies in Kobernick's chart notes. Ashley Regional subsequently extracted this chart 
note from the electronic medical record for a period of several weeks, after which it was then 
reinserted into her chart. 
SUMMARY SUSPENSION 
26. On October 8, 2008, following B.S.'s transfer to Salt Lake City Ashley Regional 
asked Dr. Thomas to voluntarily agree to the summary suspension of his clinical privileges and 
medical staff membership pending peer review. Dr. Thomas reluctantly agreed to the summary 
suspension. 
27. After Dr. Thomas agreed to the suspension Defendant Hutt disseminated 
confidential information concerning his suspension to Ashley Regional's medical staff Rumors 
concerning Dr. Thomas' suspension quickly spread through the community and through 
healthcare facilities as distant as Salt Lake City. The rumors included rumors and innuendo that 
Dr. Thomas had lost his medical license and harmed a patient. 
SURGERY AND CARE OF PATIENT C.P. 
28. On October 1, 2008, Dr. Thomas performed an abdominal hysterectomy and 
salpingo-oophorectomy on a patient identified as C.P. The surgery was remarkable due to 
extensive pelvic adhesions involving the bowel. Despite these difficulties the patient tolerated 
7 
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the procedure well and there were no complications. 
29. C.P. had a protracted postoperative course involving respiratory problems related 
to her history of tobacco use. She then began to exhibit bowel symptoms on October 6, 2008 at 
which time Dr. Thomas ordered imaging tests including x-rays and a CT scan on October 7, 
2008. David M. Perry, M.D. reviewed the x-rays (shot around 12:00 a.m. on October 7, 2008 
and the CT of the abdomen and pelvis (shot around 5:00 p.m., October 7, 2008). Dr. Perry noted 
the presence of free intraperitoneal air and free fluid in his chart notes. Free intraperitoneal air 
and free fluid does not necessarily implicate a bowel perforation. Additionally, this CT was 
performed with contrast dye and nothing in Dr. Perry's report indicates leakage into the 
peritoneal cavity. Nothing in Dr. Perry's chart note for that date indicates that he advised Dr. 
Thomas that he suspected a bowel perforation or that he recommended that C.P. be returned to 
surgery. Additionally there was no sign of an abscess mentioned in his report. 
30. A finding of a perforated bowel is a serious finding. The proper standard of care 
for a radiologist, upon suspecting a perforated bowel, would have been to advise the surgeon of 
the suspicion of perforated bowel immediately, recommend return to surgery, and document 
advising the surgeon of the perforated bowel and document the recommendation of a return to 
surgery in his radiology report. 
31. On October 8, 2008, Dr. Thomas' privileges were summarily suspended as 
discussed in ^ 26, above. Care of C.P. was then transferred to another surgeon. 
32. On October 9, 2008 C.P. underwent a second CT ordered by C.P.'s newly 
assigned surgeon. Dr. Perry allegedly spoke with the CT technician who indicated additional 
8 
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peritoneal fluid and air was present and that he believed the patient had a perforated bowel and 
recommended that she return to surgery. Dr. Perry dictated a chart note concerning this CT on 
October 10, 2008 and again made no mention of a suspected bowel perforation. In fact, Dr. 
Perry's chart notes make no mention of a suspected bowel perforation until his radiology report 
concerning chest x-rays taken on October 9, 2008 and dictated on October 13, 2008. 
33. C.P. became acutely ill on October 10, 2008 and she returned to surgery that 
afternoon. Subsequent to this second surgery C.P. developed respiratory distress and was 
transferred to Salt Lake City for further treatment at the Intermountain Medical Center Shock 
Trauma Intensive Care Unit. 
34. On October 15, 2008 Dr. Perry amended his October 7, 2008 chart note and 
falsely stated that he informed Dr. Thomas that the first CT study demonstrated free 
intraperitoneal air and that he was concerned that the patient had a bowel perforation. He further 
states that on October 9, 2008 he spoke with Defendant Hutt and falsely advised Hutt that he had 
informed Dr. Thomas that he was concerned that C.P. had a perforated bowel. The original 
October 7, 2008 chart note was extracted from both the patient's hard copy medical record as 
well as the hospital's electronic medical record for C.P. 
PEER REVIEW 
35. Ashley Regional sought peer review of Dr. Thomas' care of B.S., C.P. and five 
other patients through CIMRO Quality Healthcare Solutions. Ashley Regional did not provide 
CIMRO with Dr. Thomas' chart note documenting the inconsistencies and misrepresentations 
contained in Kobernick's charts for patient B.S. Ashley Regional did not provide CIMRO with 
9 
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Dr. Perry's original chart note of October 7, 2008 for patient C.P,, which makes no mention of 
advising Dr. Thomas of a potentially serious finding of a perforated bowel, nor makes a 
recommendation that C.P. return to surgery. CIMRO conducted its peer review without these 
necessary documents. 
36. In October 2008, after receiving CIMRO's peer review, the MEC conducted an 
MEC peer review meeting. At the meeting, Dr. Thomas brought the extraction of Dr. Perry's 
October 7, 2008 chart note to Defendant Hurt's attention. Dr. Thomas also advised Defendant 
Hutt that if Dr. Perry had truly suspected a perforated bowel on October 7, 2008 then the October 
7 chart note was substantively deficient. Defendant Hutt refused to acknowledge wrongdoing on 
the part of either Dr. Perry, himself or Ashley Regional in permitting the potentially deficient 
chart note to be extracted and amended seven days later. 
37. On October 27, 2008, after the MEC peer review meeting, Ashley Regional 
advised Dr. Thomas by letter that the MEC had decided to recommend that Dr. Thomas' clinical 
privileges and medical staff membership be revoked. 
38. On October 30, 2008, Dr. Thomas requested a hearing under the Fair Hearing 
Plan by letter. This request was reiterated on November 7, 2008 by a letter from counsel to 
Michael Olsen, M.D. the Chief of Staff of Ashley Regional and Chairperson of the MEC. 
39. On December 2, 2008, Ashley Regional provided notice of a hearing scheduled 
for December 18, 2008 at Ashley Regional. The notice indicated, in part, that the MEC's 
decision was based on a lack of adequate clinical judgment and decision making as evidenced by 
his care of B.S. and C.P. 
10 
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40. On December 11, 2008, Dr. Thomas requested a postponement of the fair hearing. 
Dr. Thomas demonstrated good cause for the postponement on the basis that Dr. Thomas was 
unable to secure physician representation and witnesses to testify on his behalf at the Fair 
Hearing due to the proximity of the holidays. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Contract by Ashley Regional 
41. Paragraphs 1 -40 of Plaintif s complaint are incorporated and realleged. 
42. The Bylaws, the Fair Hearing Plan, and the Staff Rules create a contractual 
relationship between Dr. Thomas and Ashley Regional. 
43. Ashley Regional has breached this contractual relationship in numerous ways 
including but not limited: 
a. Ashley Regional, maliciously and in bad faith did not provide CIMRO with 
Dr. Thomas' chart note documenting the inconsistencies and 
misrepresentations contained in Kobernick's charts for patient B.S.; 
b. Ashley Regional, maliciously and in bad faith did not provide CIMRO with 
Dr. Perry's original chart note of October 7, 2008 for patient C.P., which 
makes no mention of advising Dr. Thomas of a potentially serious finding of a 
perforated bowel, nor makes a recommendation that C.P. return to surgery; 
c. Ashley Regional by and through Defendant Hutt maliciously and in bad faith 
disclosed confidential information regarding Dr. Thomas' summary 
suspension to Ashley Regional's medical staff 
11 
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d. Ashley Regional, despite good cause shown, denied a postponement of the 
Fair Hearing to permit Dr. Thomas to arrange for physican representation and 
witnesses to testify on his behalf. 
44. Ashley Regional's breaches of the parties contractual relationship has caused, and 
is continuing to cause, Dr. Thomas direct and substantial economic damage for which Dr. 
Thomas seeks actual damages in an amount to be proven at trial. Furthermore, Ashley 
Regional5s breaches demonstrate that Dr. Thomas will not receive a fair hearing and accordingly 
Dr. Thomas seeks relief in the form of injunctive relief enjoining Ashley Regional from 
proceeding with the hearing. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing by Ashley Regional 
45. Paragraphs 1-44 of Plaintiff s Complaint are incorporated and realleged. 
46. Implied in every contract is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
which Ashley Regional has breached by and through their actions to push Dr. Thomas out. 
47. Said conduct has caused and is continuing to cause Dr. Thomas direct and 
substantial economic damage for which Dr. Thomas wSeeks actual damages in an amount to be 
proven at trial. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Defamation by all Defendants 
48. Paragraphs 1-47 of Plaintiff s Complaint are incorporated and realleged. 
49. Dr. Thomas' practice relies on referrals from other physicians and the community 
for new patients. Patients seeking an OB/G YN physician are unwilling to consider care from a 
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rs ."•S 
physician who may not be practicing in the community in the near future because they desire 
continuity of care throughout their pregnancy. Physicians and persons in the community will not 
refer new patients to an OB/GYN if they believe that the OB/GYN's practice will close in the 
near future and that the OB/GYN will not be available to care for the patient for the duration of a 
pregnancy and the delivery of the baby. In August 2008 Defendant Hutt attended a confidential 
medical staff meeting. The medical staff attending the meeting are referral sources for Dr. 
Thomas. During the meeting Hutt advised the medical staff that Dr. Thomas was "not going to 
make it" and that he was recruiting an OB/GYN to replace Dr. Thomas 
50. Furthermore, sometime during the late summer or fall of 2008, Defendant Guyant, 
posted a recruiting notice on the internet stating as follows: 
OB-GYN—The Hospital had 27% grown year over year from 2006 over 2007. 
Many young families are moving to the area for work. Dr. Griffith has a full 
practice as does Dr. Breitenbach (FP/OB). Dr. Anderson (FP/OB is on track to 
deliver about 60 babies this year. Dr. Thomas, OB/GYN—who arrived 2 years 
before Dr. Thomas (sic) is struggling and it appears he may not stay in the 
community. The new physician would replace Dr. Thomas, as there probably is 
not room for 5 OBs on staff. 
51. Upon information and belief, the information contained in the recruiting notice 
was provided to Defendant Guyant by Ashley Regional and/or Defendant Hutt. 
52. The aforesaid defamatory statements constituted the dissemination of a known 
falsehood, or of information, with a reckless disregard for whether or not it is true or false, and 
were made in bad faith. 
53. Said conduct has caused and is continuing to cause Dr. Thomas direct and special 
damages for which Dr. Thomas seeks actual damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Restraint of Trade by all Defendants 
54. Paragraphs 1-53 of Plaintiff s Complaint are incorporated and realleged. 
55. Defendants actions to push Dr. Thomas out demonstrate that Defendants 
conspired to restrain Dr. Thomas's trade and that they were acting with malice and bad faith. 
56. Said conduct has caused and is continuing to cause Dr. Thomas direct and 
substantial economic damage for which Dr. Thomas pursuant to Utah's Antitrust Act found in 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-9111 et seq, seeks treble damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Dr. Thomas prays for judgment against the Defendants as follows: 
1. For the FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF, Dr. Thomas requests that the Court award 
actual damages in an amount to be determined at trial and injunctive relief enjoining Ashley 
Regional from maintaining his summary suspension and proceeding with the fair hearing; 
2. For the SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF, Dr. Thomas requests that the Court 
award actual damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 
3. For the THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF, Dr. Thomas requests that the Court award 
actual damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 
4. For the FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF, Dr. Thomas requests that the Court 
award treble damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 
5. That Dr. Thomas be awarded his reasonable attorney fees and costs; 
6. Interest at the highest allowable rate; and 
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7. For such other and further relief as Dr. Thomas is entitled to and the Court deems 
just and proper. 
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
Plaintiff respectfully requests this matter be tried to a jury. 
DATED this / > day of December, 2008. 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
PETER STIRBA 
DARIN GOFF 
R. BLAKE HAMILTON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs Address 
Richard Thomas, M.D. 
175 North 100 West, Suite 105 
Vernal, UT 84078 
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DEC-16-2008 10:81 FROM:DRTHOI • ^ 4357896759 TO. ±3648355 P.2'S 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
; si>. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
1, Richard Thomas, M.D., being duly sworn, state that 1 have personal knowledge of the 
facts set forth in the foregoing VERIFIED COMPLAINT and that the facts set forth therein arc 
accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
DATED: DECEMBER J&L, 2008 
Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by Richard Thomas, M.D., whose 
identity is known to me or proven to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence, this /C* day of 
December, 2008, 
Nota^ Public y £ T* 
NOTARY PUBLIC H 
ANGIE HARFUNGER 
7181 S. CAMPUS VIEW DR « 
WEST JORDAN, UTAH 64084 I 
COMMISSION EXPIRES \ 
SEPTEMBER 7,2010 I 
STATE OF UTAH | 
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FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
JAN \ 3 m 
BY 
RICHARD V. THOMAS 
38 East 100 North, Suite A 
Vernal, UT 84078 
435-789-8627 Phone 
435-789-6759 Fax 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD V. THOMAS, MD 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
ASHLEY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER; 
SI HUTT, individually; 
JOHN GRIFFITH, MD, individually; 
DAVID PERRY, MD, individually; 
DAVID RICHARDS, MD, individually; 
KIMBERLY KOBERNICK, RN, individually; 
DEBBIE SPAFFORD, individually, 
Defendants. 
AMMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Case No: 110800013 
Judge: Clark McClellan 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff Richard V. Thomas, MD, hereby complains against 
Defendants, and alleges as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff, Richard V. Thomas, MD, is a physician practicing obstetrics and gynecology 
(OB/GYN) in Vernal, UT. 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. Defendant Ashley Regional Medical Center (ARMC) is a private medical facility wholly 
owned by LifePoint Hospitals, Inc. and located in Vernal, Utah. 
3. Defendant Si Hurt (Hutt) is the CEO of ARMC. 
4. Defendant John Griffith, MD (Griffith) is a physician practicing obstetrics and gynecology 
(OB/GYN) in Vernal, Utah. 
5. Defendant David Perry, MD (Perry) is a physician practicing radiology in Vernal, Utah. 
6. Defendant David Richards, MD (Richards) is a physician practicing general surgery in 
Vernal, Utah. 
7. Defendant Kimberly Kobemick, RN (Kobemick) is a registered nurse practicing in Vernal, 
Utah. 
8. Defendant Debbie Spafford is the Risk Management Director of ARMC and resides in 
Vernal, Utah. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
9. This Court has original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-5-102. 
10. Venue in this action is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-304 and 
§78B-3-307. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
11. Plaintiff had clinical privileges and medical staff membership at ARMC from November 
2004 to October 2008. 
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12. Plaintiff practiced as an OB/GYN at ARMC from November 2004 to October 2008. 
13. Griffith was the only other OB/GYN on staff at any time at ARMC between November 2004 
and October 2008. 
14. Griffith was in direct competition with the Plaintiff. 
15. Griffith held the position of OB Department Head in October 2008. 
16. Griffith was a member of ARMC's Medical Executive Committee (MEC) in October 2008. 
17. According to Article XII «|[ 12.2-1 of ARMC's Bylaws, CEO Hutt is considered an "ex-
officio" member of the MEC. 
18. Griffith, Richards and the Plaintiff used the same billing and practice management 
contractor, Carepoint Network, in 2008. 
19. The Plaintiff was approached by the President of Carepoint Network, Kent Mecham 
(Mecham), and suggested that the Plaintiff employ similar billing techniques as those being 
employed by Griffith. 
20. The Plaintiff stated to Mecham that he felt such billing practices constituted fraud and he 
would not go forward with such practices. 
21. Mecham admitted to the Plaintiff that he disclosed the fact that the Plaintiff felt the billing 
practices constituted fraud to both Griffith and Hutt. 
22. During 2008, Hutt was dissatisfied with the financial condition of the Plaintiffs practice. 
23. At no time did Hutt discuss the specific financial condition of the Plaintiffs practice directly 
with the Plaintiff. 
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24. In August of 2008, Hutt attended a medical staff meeting in which he informed those 
attending that the Plaintiff was "not going to make it" and that he was actively recruiting 
another OB/GYN to replace the Plaintiff. 
25. The Plaintiff was not present in the above mentioned meeting. 
26. Sometime during 2008, Lifepoint Hospitals, using information received from Hutt, 
distributed a recruiting notice stating as follows: 
OB-GYN - The Hospital had 27% grown year over year from 2006 over 2007. 
Many young families are moving to the area for work. Dr. Griffith has a full 
practice as does Dr. Breitenbach (FP/OB). Dr, Anderson (FP/OB) is on track to 
deliver about 60 babies this year. Dr. Thomas, OB/GYN - who arrived 2 years 
before Dr. Thomas (sic) is struggling and it appears he may not stay in the 
community. The new physician would replace Dr. Thomas, as there probably is 
not room for 5 OB's on staff, 
27. On the morning of October 8, 2008, the Plaintiff performed a vaginal hysterectomy on a 
patient to be identified as X. 
28. After surgery, X was transferred to the medical surgical floor and her care was assumed by 
Kimberly Kobernick, RN. 
29. On the medical surgical floor, X's blood pressure fluctuated and her vital signs became 
unstable. 
30. The Plaintiff was notified of the fluctuating blood pressures and unstable vital signs and 
ordered an ultrasound to be performed. 
31. The ultrasound confirmed internal bleeding and patient X was taken immediately to 
emergency surgery, performed by the Plaintiff and assisted by Richards. 
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32. During the emergency surgery, the Plaintiff successfully arrested the bleeding. 
33. In the evening of October 8, 2008, Hutt and Dr. Michael Olsen, Medical Chief of Staff at 
ARMC, met with the Plaintiff and summarily suspended his clinical privileges at ARMC. 
34. Subsequent to his suspension, the Plaintiff reviewed and found inconsistencies and fraudulent 
misrepresentations made in patient X's record made by nurse Kobernick. 
35. Immediately upon finding inconsistencies and fraudulent misrepresentation made in the 
patient's record, the Plaintiff notified Chief of Staff Michael Olsen. 
36. Upon information and belief, the Plaintiffs clinical privileges at ARMC were summarily 
suspended due to the malicious and fraudulent misrepresentations made by Richards and 
Kobernick. 
37. At the Fair Hearing the MEC was represented by Griffith. 
38. The MEC met on October 23, 2008 to gather information so as to be able to determine if 
termination of the Plaintiffs privileges and medical staff membership was justified. 
39. Hutt participated in the MEC's final recommendation to terminate the privileges and medical 
staff membership of the Plaintiff. 
40. CIMRO is an organization that offers independent peer review. 
41. CIMRO's review consisted of answers to prepared questions posed by ARMC, authored by 
Spafford. 
42. Article XIV ^  14.1(b) of ARMC's Bylaws states: 
"MALICE means the dissemination of a known falsehood, or of information, with a 
reckless disregard for whether or not it is true or false." 
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Contract by ARMC 
43. Paragraphs 1-42 of Plaintiff s Complaint are incorporated and realleged. 
44. Clinical privileges and medical staff membership at ARMC are governed by Medical Staff 
Bylaws, The Fair Hearing Plan, and the Medical Staff Rules and Regulations. 
45. The Medical Staff Bylaws, The Fair Hearing Plan, and the Medical Staff Rules and 
Regulations create a contractual relationship between the Plaintiff and ARMC. 
46. The Medical Staff Bylaws, The Fair Hearing Plan, and the Medical Staff Rules and 
Regulations provide a contractual right to a fair peer review process, including an impartial 
tribunal, 
47. Article XIV \ 14.3 of ARMC's Bylaws states: 
"Information, with respect to any practitioner, submitted, collected, or prepared by any 
representative of this or any other health care facility or organization or Medical Staff for the 
purpose of achieving and maintaining quality patient care, reducing morbidity and mortality, 
or contributing to clinical research shall, to the fullest extent permitted by law, be 
confidential and shall not be disseminated to anyone other than a representative, nor used in 
any way except as provided herein or except as otherwise required by law. Such 
confidentiality shall also extend to information of like kind that may be provided by third 
parties. This information shall not become part of any particular patient's file or of the 
general hospital records." 
48. Article XIV *[] 14.5-1 of ARMC's Bylaws states the following with respect to the activities 
that are covered by Article XIV K 14.3 of ARMC's Bylaws: 
"The confidentiality and immunity provided by this Article shall apply to all acts, 
communications, reports, recommendations, or disclosures performed or made in connection 
with this or any other health care facility's or organization's activities concerning but not 
limited to: ... (c) Corrective action; (d) Hearings and appellate reviews; (e) Other hospital 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
department, committee, or Medical Staff activities related to Process Improvement activities 
and appropriate professional conduct." 
49. On October 9, 2008, Hutt disseminated confidential information, as defined by ARMC's 
Bylaws, regarding the Plaintiff, to multiple employees of ARMC. 
50. On January 9, 2009, while being accompanied by Spafford, Plaintiff discovered forged 
medical documents in the medical records department of ARMC. 
51. On January 9, 2009, upon discovery of the forged medical documents by the Plaintiff, 
Spafford was immediately notified. 
52. After discovering the forged medical records, while the Plaintiff was preparing his defense 
for the fair hearing, he was prohibited access to original patient records, both electronic and 
official hard copy, at ARMC. 
53. When Spafford was asked why the Plaintiff could not have access to patient records, Plaintiff 
was told that ARMC's attorney had instructed them not to allow the Plaintiff to even view 
the medical records in either official electronic or hard copy. 
54. Article III, ^ 3.3 of The Fair Hearing Plan states, in part: 
"The practitioner who requested the hearing shall be entitled to be accompanied and 
represented at the hearing by an appointee of the Medical Staff in good standing or by a 
member of his local professional society." 
55. The Plaintiff was not given the option to be represented by an appointee of the Medical Staff 
or by a member of his local professional society during the Fair Hearing process. 
56. Article VIII, ^ 8.1 of The Fair Hearing Plan states, in part: 
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"None of the parties shall be represented by an attorney at any hearing or appellate 
review." 
57. During the appellate review the attorney representing ARMC was present. 
58. During the appellate review the attorney representing ARMC testified to the Board of 
Trustees on behalf of ARMC. 
59. During the appellate review the attorney representing the Board of Trustees of ARMC was 
present. 
60. During the appellate review the Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to be represented by an 
attorney. 
61. ARMC violated the Plaintiffs rights to a fair peer review process and an impartial tribunal in 
the following ways: 
a. Notwithstanding the presentation of genuine issues of disputed material facts by 
the Plaintiff, ARMC, through Spafford, knowingly went forward and provided 
CIMRO with incomplete, altered, and fraudulent medical records. 
b. ARMC failed to adequately investigate the issues of disputed material facts made 
by the Plaintiff prior to submitting information to be reviewed by CIMRO. 
c. At no time prior to the original fair hearing date, was the Plaintiff provided with 
any specific allegations to which he could formally respond to the MEC. 
d. Up to two days prior to the originally scheduled fair hearing, the Plaintiff had not 
been provided with any medical records by ARMC for his experts to review. 
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e. After requesting patient records to provide to the Plaintiffs expert witnesses, 
Defendant Spafford maliciously and in bad faith provided the Plaintiff with 
incomplete and fraudulent patient records. 
f. CIMRO was provided a letter from Griffith discussing his concern in regards to 
the technique that was used in the procedure of one of the cases being reviewed, 
which negated CIMRO's position of independence. 
g. The information against the Plaintiff was presented to the MEC by Griffith, a 
direct competitor to the Plaintiff. 
h. The Plaintiff was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses whose testimony was 
relied upon by the MEC. 
i. Hutt participated in the MEC decision making process while actively recruiting 
another physician to replace the Plaintiff, 
j . The information against the Plaintiff, presented to the MEC, was incomplete and 
contained altered and fraudulent medical records, 
k. In making its decision to terminate the privileges and medical staff membership of 
the Plaintiff, the MEC substantially relied on the opinions of CIMRO. 
62. ARMCs breaches of its contractual relationship with the Plaintiff have caused, and continue 
to cause, economic damage which the Plaintiff seeks actual damages in an amount to be 
proven at trial. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing by ARMC 
63. Paragraphs 1-62 of Plaintiff s Complaint are incorporated and realleged. 
64. Implied in every contract is a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
65. ARMC breached its covenant of good faith and fair dealing with the Plaintiff. 
66. Said breach by ARMC has caused and is continuing to cause the Plaintiff direct and 
substantial economic damage for which the Plaintiff seeks actual damages in an amount to be 
proven at trial. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Defamation by all Defendants 
67. Paragraphs 1-66 of Plaintiff s Complaint are incorporated and realleged. 
68. In August 2008, Hurt maliciously commented in a medical staff meeting that the Plaintiff 
was "not going to make it", and that he was recruiting an OB/GYN to replace the Plaintiff. 
69. In 2008, LifePoint e-mailed a recruiting notice stating in part that the Plaintiff, "...is 
struggling and it appears he may not stay in the community. The new physician would 
replace Dr. Thomas, as there probably is not room for 5 OB's on staff." 
70. Perry maliciously and in bad faith entered into patient Y's medical record accusations about 
the Plaintiffs care that were known to be false. 
71. Richards maliciously and in bad faith gave information to representatives of ARMC and the 
MEC about the Plaintiffs care of patient X which he knew to be false. 
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72. Kobernick maliciously and in bad faith entered into patient X's medical record information 
about the Plaintiffs care of patient X which she knew to be incomplete and false. 
73. Kobernick maliciously and in bad faith gave information to representatives of ARMC and the 
MEC about the Plaintiffs care of patient X which she knew to be incomplete and false. 
74. Griffith maliciously and in bad faith presented information to the MEC which he knew to be 
incomplete and false. 
75. Spafford maliciously and in bad faith supplied information to CIMRO which she knew to be 
incomplete and false. 
76. The aforesaid defamatory statements constitute the dissemination of a known falsehood, or of 
information, with a reckless disregard for whether or not it is true or false, and were made in 
bad faith. 
77. Said conduct has caused and is continuing to cause the Plaintiff direct and special damages 
for which the Plaintiff seeks actual damages in an amount to be proven at trial 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Restraint of Trade by all Defendants 
78. Paragraphs 1-77 of Plaintiff s Complaint are incorporated and realleged. 
79. Defendants' actions to try and replace the Plaintiff maliciously and through a sham peer 
review process demonstrate that the Defendants conspired to restrain the Plaintiffs trade and 
that they were acting with malice and in bad faith. 
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80. Said conduct has caused and is continuing to cause the Plaintiff substantial economic damage 
for which the Plaintiff seeks treble damages, in accordance with Utah State Law, in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Negligence by All Defendants 
81. Paragraphs 1-80 of Plaintiff s Complaint are incorporated and realleged. 
82. Because of the potential consequences of the situation, the Defendant's owed the Plaintiff a 
legal duty to exercise a high standard of care in the gathering and authentication of facts that 
were to be used in a peer review process. 
83. All Defendants were made aware by the Plaintiff that the information gathered for the peer 
review process was incomplete and not factually true. 
84. Notwithstanding the expressed concerns of the Plaintiff, the Defendants went forward and 
used the incomplete and fraudulent information maliciously and in bad faith. 
85. As a direct result, said conduct has caused and is continuing to cause the Plaintiff substantial 
economic damage for which the Plaintiff seeks damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Fraud by all Defendants 
86. Paragraphs 1-85 of Plaintiff s Complaint are incorporated and realleged. 
87. Perry maliciously and in bad faith entered into a patient's medical record accusations about 
the Plaintiff that were known to be false. 
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88. Kobernick maliciously and in bad faith entered into a patient's medical record information 
about the Plaintiff she knew to be incomplete and false. 
89. Si Hutt maliciously and in bad faith ordered an independent CIMRO review of medical 
records he knew to be incomplete and false, 
90. Spafford maliciously and in bad faith sent medical records to CIMRO which she knew to be 
incomplete and false. 
91. The defendants intended CIMRO to offer a review of medical records they knew to be 
incomplete and false. 
92. CIMRO reasonably relied on the incomplete and false information that was presented to 
them and issued a review based on said information. 
93. Griffith maliciously and in bad faith presented information to the MEC which he knew to be 
incomplete and false, including the CIMRO review. 
94. Said conduct has caused and is continuing to cause the Plaintiff direct damages for which the 
Plaintiff seeks actual damages in an amount to be proven at trial 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by all Defendants 
95. Paragraphs 1-94 of Plaintiff s Complaint are incorporated and realleged, 
96. The malicious introduction of incomplete and fraudulent information into medical records 
was performed by the Defendants intentionally and with reckless disregard. 
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97. This same incomplete and fraudulent information was maliciously and in bad faith used in 
the Plaintiffs peer review process. 
98. The defendants knew or should have known that these actions would foreseeably cause the 
Plaintiff severe emotional distress. 
99. The Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer severe emotional distress as a direct result. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendants as follows: 
100. For the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION, the Plaintiff requests that the Court award actual 
damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 
101. For the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, the Plaintiff requests that the Court award 
actual damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 
102. For the THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION, the Plaintiff requests that the Court award actual 
damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 
103. For the FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION, the Plaintiff requests that the Court award treble 
damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 
104. For the FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION, the Plaintiff requests that the Court award actual 
damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 
105. For the SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION, the Plaintiff requests that the Court award actual 
damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 
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106. For the SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION, the Plaintiff requests that the Court award 
damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 
107. That the Plaintiff be reinstated to the medical staff of ARMC, with all rights and 
privileges that he had prior to his summary suspension. 
108. That the Plaintiffs professional record be cleared with any and all state, national or 
professional databanks that keep record of such data. 
109. That the Plaintiffs hospital file record be cleared of any and all information in relation to 
this peer review process. 
110. That the Plaintiff be awarded reasonable attorney fees and court costs; 
111. Interest at the highest allowable rate; and 
112. For such other and further relief as the Plaintiff is entitled to and the Court deems just and 
proper. 
113. The Plaintiff also respectfully requests the right to amend this complaint if so justified 
during the course of discovery. 
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
114. The Plaintiff respectfully requests this matter be tried to a jury. / -
DATED this 12* day of January, 2011. X / / / / 
Dr. Kichard V, Thomi 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF UINTAH ) 
I, Richard V. Thomas, MD, being duly sworn, state that I have personal 
knowledge of the facts set forth in the foregoing VERIFIED COMPLAINT and that the 
facts set forth therein are accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
DATED: JANUARY 12, 2011 
Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by Richard Thomas, MD, 
whose identity is known to me or proven to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence, this 
12th day of January, 2011. 
,;,MANEEIM MANGUM \ <3U&*OJ^ y/A2s*av»*^/ 
t W J Notary Picric i Notary Public 
"
lv3-ir;^--' Staff? cr Uiah j 
?.':> : ' o n ! M i ! ; : . . i > < : '<•!',.";» «.),-.Mut>Pf .";! . 
••! thy- \--.••-..• j . i p < , ( ) y : ; 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I served a copy of the attached AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL, by placing a true and correct copy in an envelope addressed to: 
Ashley Regional Medical Center 
150 West 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
SiHutt 
150 West 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
John Griffith, MD 
South Medical Office Building 
150 West 100 North, Suite 104 
Vernal, UT 84078 
David Perry, MD 
150 West 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
David Richards, MD 
175 North 100 West 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Kimberly Kobernick, RN 
1666 East 4000 South 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Debbie Spafford 
150 West 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid thereon, in the United States Mail 
at Vernal, Utah, on the 12th day of January, 2011. 
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